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Abstract
TVARAK efficiently implements system-level redundancy
for direct-access (DAX) NVM storage. Production storage
systems complement device-level ECC (which covers media
errors) with system-checksums and cross-device parity. This
system-level redundancy enables detection of and recovery
from data corruption due to device firmware bugs (e.g., read-
ing data from the wrong physical location). Direct access to
NVM penalizes software-only implementations of system-level
redundancy, forcing a choice between lack of data protection
or significant performance penalties. Offloading the update
and verification of system-level redundancy to TVARAK, a
hardware controller co-located with the last-level cache, en-
ables efficient protection of data from such bugs in memory
controller and NVM DIMM firmware. Simulation-based evalu-
ation with seven data-intensive applications shows TVARAK’s
performance and energy efficiency. For example, TVARAK
reduces Redis set-only performance by only 3%, compared to
50% reduction for a state-of-the-art software-only approach.
1. Introduction
Non-volatile memory (NVM) storage improves the perfor-
mance of stateful applications by offering DRAM-like perfor-
mance with disk-like durability [7, 8, 16, 19, 74]. Applications
that seek to leverage raw NVM performance eschew conven-
tional file system and block interfaces in favor of direct access
(DAX) to NVM. With DAX, an application maps NVM data
into its address space and uses load and store instructions to
access it, eliminating system software overheads from the data
path [15, 19, 40, 69, 70].
Production storage systems protect data from various fail-
ures. In addition to fail-stop failures like machine or device
crashes, storage systems also need to protect data from silent
corruption due to firmware bugs. Storage device firmware
is prone to bugs because of its complexity, and these bugs
can cause data corruption. Such corruption-inducing firmware
bugs fall into two broad categories: lost write bugs and misdi-
rected read or write bugs [10, 11, 31, 52, 65]. Lost write bugs
cause the firmware to acknowledge a write without ever up-
dating the data on the device media. Misdirected read or write
bugs cause the firmware to read or write the data from the
wrong location on the device media. Firmware-bug-induced
corruption will go unnoticed even in the presence of device-
level ECC, because that ECC is read/written as an atom with
its data during each media access performed by the firmware.
Protection against firmware-bug-induced corruption com-
monly relies on system-checksums for detection and cross-
device parity for recovery. System-checksums are data check-
sums that the storage system computes and verifies at a layer
"above" the device firmware (e.g., the file system), using sepa-
rate I/O requests than for the corresponding data [10, 52, 75].
Using separate I/O requests for the data and the block contain-
ing its system-checksum (together with system-checksums for
other data) reduces the likelihood of an undetected firmware-
bug-induced corruption. This is because a bug is unlikely
to affect both in a consistent manner. Thus, the storage sys-
tem can detect a firmware-bug-induced corruption because
of a mismatch between the two. It can then trigger recovery
using the cross-device parity [35, 43, 47, 83]. In this paper,
we use the term redundancy to refer to the combination of
system-checksums and cross-device parity.
Production NVM-based storage systems will need such re-
dundancy mechanisms for the same reasons as conventional
storage. NVM device firmware involves increasingly complex
functionality, akin to that of other storage devices, making
it susceptible to both lost write and misdirected read/write
bugs. However, most existing NVM storage system designs
provide insufficient protection. Although fault-tolerant NVM
file systems [50, 75] efficiently cover data accessed through
the file system interfaces, they do not cover DAX-mapped
data. The Pangolin [1] library is an exception, implementing
system-checksums and parity for applications that use its trans-
actional library interface. However, software-only approaches
for DAX NVM redundancy incur significant performance over-
head (e.g., 50% slowdown for a Redis set-only workload, even
with Pangolin’s streamlined design).
This paper proposes TVARAK1, a software-managed hard-
ware offload that efficiently maintains redundancy for DAX
NVM data. TVARAK co-resides with the last level cache
(LLC) controllers and coordinates with the file system to pro-
vide DAX data coverage without application involvement.
The file system informs TVARAK when it DAX-maps a file.
TVARAK verifies each DAX NVM cache-line read and updates
the redundancy for each DAX NVM cache-line write-back.
TVARAK’s design relies on two key elements to achieve
efficient redundancy verification and updates. First, TVARAK
reconciles the mismatch between DAX granularities (typically
64-byte cache lines) and typical 4KB system-checksum block
sizes by introducing cache-line granular system-checksums
(only) while data is DAX-mapped. TVARAK accesses these
cache-line granular system-checksums, which are themselves
packed into cache-line-sized units, via separate NVM accesses.
Maintaining these checksums only for DAX-mapped data
limits the resulting space overhead. Second, TVARAK uses
caching to reduce the number of extra NVM accesses for re-
1TVARAK means accelerator in Hindi.
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dundancy information. Applications’ data access locality leads
to reuse of system-checksum and parity cache-lines; TVARAK
leverages this reuse with a small dedicated on-controller cache
and configurable LLC partitions for redundancy information.
Simulation-based evaluation with seven applications, each
with multiple workloads, demonstrates TVARAK’s promise of
efficient DAX NVM storage redundancy. For Redis, TVARAK
incurs only a 3% slowdown for maintaining redundancy with
a set-only workload, in contrast to 50% slowdown with Pan-
golin’s efficient software approach, without compromising on
coverage or checks. For other applications and workloads, the
results consistently show that TVARAK efficiently updates and
verifies system-checksums and parity, especially in compari-
son to software-only alternatives. The efficiency benefits are
seen in both application runtimes and energy.
This paper makes three primary contributions. First, it mo-
tivates the need for architectural support for DAX NVM stor-
age redundancy, highlighting the limitations of software-only
approaches. Second, it proposes TVARAK, a low-overhead,
software-managed hardware offload for DAX NVM storage
redundancy. It describes the challenges for efficient hardware
DAX NVM redundancy and how TVARAK overcomes these
challenges with straightforward, effective design. Third, it
reports on extensive evaluation of TVARAK’s runtime, energy,
and memory access overheads for seven applications, each
under multiple workloads, showing its efficiency especially in
comparison to software-only alternatives.
2. Redundancy Mechanisms and NVM Storage
This section provides background and discusses related work.
First, it describes conventional storage redundancy mecha-
nisms for firmware bug resilience. Second, it discusses the
need for these mechanisms in NVM storage systems, the direct-
access (DAX) interface to NVM storage, and the challenges
in maintaining the required redundancy with DAX. Third, it
discusses related work and where TVARAK fits.
2.1. Redundancy for Firmware Bug Resilience
Production storage systems employ a variety of redundancy
mechanisms to address a variety of faults [22,29,35,37,45,47,
48, 75, 79, 81]. In this work, we focus on redundancy mecha-
nisms used to detect and recover from firmware-bug-induced
data corruption (specifically, per-page system-checksums and
cross-device parity).
Firmware-bug-induced data corruption: Large-scale
studies of deployed storage systems show that device firmware
bugs sometimes lead to data loss or corruption [10, 11, 31, 52,
65]. Device firmware, like any software, is prone to bugs be-
cause of its complex responsibilities (e.g., address translation,
dynamic re-mapping, wear leveling, block caching, request
scheduling) that have increased both in number and complex-
ity over time. Research has even proposed embedding the
entire file system functionality [32] and application-specific
functionalities [2,13,59,60,71] in device firmware. Increasing
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(a) The problem: device responds to read of block that experienced the lost
write with incorrect (old) data.
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(b) The fix: having the higher-level system update and verify system-
checksums when writing or reading data, in separate requests to the device,
enables detection of a lost write because of mismatch between the data and the
system-checksum.
Figure 1: Lost write bug example. Both sub-figures show a time-
line for a storage device with three media locations. The device
is shown in an initial state, and then upon completion of higher-
level system’s write or read to data (first, a successful write, then
a "lost write", then a read) mapped to the same media location.
(a) shows how the higher-level system can consume incorrect
(old) data if it trusts the device to never lose an acknowledged
write. (b) shows how the higher-level system can detect a lost
write with system-checksums.
firmware complexity increases the propensity for bugs, some
of which can trigger data loss or corruption.
Corruption-inducing firmware-bugs can be categorized
into two broad categories: lost write bugs and misdirected
read/write bugs. A lost write bug causes the firmware to ac-
knowledge a write without ever updating the media with the
write request’s content. An example scenario that can lead to
a lost write is if a write-back firmware cache "forgets" that a
cached block is dirty. Fig. 1(a) illustrates a lost write bug. It
first shows (second stage in the time-line) a correct bug-free
write to the block stored in the blue media location. It then
shows a second write to the same block, but this one suffers
from a lost write bug—the firmware acknowledges the write
but never updates the blue media location. The subsequent
read of the blue block returns the old data to the application.
A misdirected write or misdirected read bug causes the
firmware to store data at or read data from an incorrect media
location, respectively. Fig. 2(a) illustrates a misdirected write
bug. As before, the first write to the block stored in the blue
location is performed correctly by the firmware. For this
example, the second write request shown is for the block
stored in the green location. But, it encounters a misdirected
write bug wherein the data is incorrectly written to the blue
media location. Notice that a misdirected write bug not only
fails to update the intended block, but also corrupts (incorrectly
replaces) the data of the block it incorrectly updates. In the
example, the subsequent read to the the block mapped to the
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(a) The problem: device responds to read with the incorrectly updated data
from the blue location. Notice that the green location also has incorrect (old)
after the misdirected write.
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(b) The fix: having the higher-level system update and verify system-
checksums when writing or reading data, in separate requests to the device,
enables enables detection of a misdirected write because of mismatch between
the data and the system-checksum.
Figure 2: Misdirected write bug example. Similar construction
to Fig. 1, but with the second operation being a write intended
for the green location that is misdirected by the firmware to the
blue location.
blue location returns this corrupted data.
Although almost all storage devices maintain error-
correcting codes (ECCs) to detect corruption due to random
bit flips [17, 30, 68, 77], these ECCs cannot detect firmware-
bug-induced corruption [10,52]. Device-level ECCs are stored
together with the data and computed and verified inline by the
same firmware during the actual media update/access. So, in
the case of a lost write, the firmware loses the ECC update
along with the corresponding data update, because the data
and ECC are written together on the media as one operation.
Similarly, misdirected writes modify the ECC to match the
incorrectly updated data and misdirected reads retrieve the
ECC corresponding to the incorrectly read data.
System-checksums for detection: Production storage sys-
tems maintain per-page system-checksums to detect firmware-
bug-induced data corruption. System-checksums are updated
and verified at a layer above the firmware, such as the file sys-
tem, stored in checksum blocks (each containing checksums
for many blocks) separate from the data, and read and written
using I/O requests separate from the corresponding data I/O
requests [22, 37, 45, 75, 79, 81]. Separating the storage and
accesses for data from corresponding system-checksums en-
ables detection of firmware-bug-induced corruption, because
such bugs are unlikely to affect both. The probability of a
bug affecting both in a consistent fashion (e.g., losing both or
misdirecting both to another corresponding data and system-
checksum pair) is even lower.
Fig. 1(b) demonstrates how system-checksums enable de-
tection of lost writes. Although the second write to the blue
block is lost, the write to the checksum block (stored in the or-
ange location) is not. Thus, upon the data read in the example,
which is paired with a corresponding system-checksum read
and verification, the lost write is detected.
Fig. 2(b) illustrates how system-checksums enable detection
of misdirected writes. A misdirected write firmware bug is
extremely unlikely to affect both the data write to the green
block and the corresponding system-checksum write to the
orange block in a consistent manner. To do so, the firmware
would have to incorrectly write the system-checksum to a
location (block and the offset within the block) that stores
the checksum for the exact block to which it misdirected the
data write. In the illustration, the read of the blue block data,
followed by its system-checksum read, results in a verification
failure. Similarly, system-checksums also trigger a verification
failure in case of a misdirected read bug, because a bug is
unlikely to affect the both the data its system-checksum read.
Cross-device parity for recovery: To recover from a de-
tected page corruption, storage systems store parity pages [29,
35, 43, 47, 48, 83]. Although parity across arbitrarily selected
pages suffice for recovery from firmware-bug-induced corrup-
tion, storage systems often implement cross-device parity that
enable recovery from device failures as well.
2.2. NVM Storage Redundancy and Direct Access (DAX)
Non-volatile memory (NVM) refers to a class of memory tech-
nologies that have DRAM-like access latency and granularity
but are also durable like disks [3,14,26,38,56]. NVM devices
have orders of magnitude lower latency and higher bandwidth
than conventional storage devices, thereby improving stateful
applications’ performance [7, 8, 16, 19, 36, 73, 74].
Need for firmware-bug resilience in NVM storage:
NVM storage systems will be prone to firmware-bug-induced
data corruption and require corresponding redundancy mech-
anisms, like conventional storage systems. NVM firmware
is susceptible to corruption-inducing bugs, because it is non-
trivial and its complexity can only be expected to increase
over time. NVM firmware already provides for address
translation, bad block management, wear leveling, request
scheduling, and other conventional firmware responsibili-
ties [53, 55, 56, 63]. Looking forward, its complexity will
only increase as more NVM-specific functionality is em-
bedded into the firmware (e.g., reducing NVM writes and
wear [12, 21, 41, 76, 84]) and as the push towards near-data
computation [2, 5, 6, 13, 20, 25, 32, 59, 60, 71, 78] continues.
Direct access NVM storage redundancy challenges:
Direct-access (DAX) interface to NVM storage exposes raw
NVM performance to applications [1, 19, 34, 40, 42, 51, 58, 64,
69,75,80]. DAX-enabled file systems map NVM-resident files
directly into application address spaces; such direct mapping is
possible because of NVM’s DRAM-like access characteristics.
DAX enables applications to access persistent data with load
and store instructions, eliminating system software overheads
from the data path.
These characteristics, however, pose challenges for main-
taining firmware-bug resiliency mechanisms [34]. First, the
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NVM Storage Redundancy Design ChecksumGranularity
Checksum/Parity Update
for DAX data
Checksum Verification
for DAX data
Performance
Overhead
Nova-Fortis [75], Plexistore [50] Page No updates No verification None
Mojim [80], HotPot [64] Page2 On application data flush Background scrubbing Very High
Pangolin [1] Object On application data flush On NVM to DRAM copy High
Anon [34] Page Periodically Background scrubbing Configurable
TVARAK Page On LLC to NVM write On NVM to LLC read Low
Table 1: Trade-offs among TVARAK and previous DAX NVM storage redundancy designs.
lack of interposed system software in the data path makes
it difficult to efficiently identify data reads and writes that
should trigger a system-checksum verification and system-
checksum/parity updates, respectively. Second, updating and
verifying system-checksums for DAX data incurs high over-
head because of the mismatch between DAX’s fine-grained
accesses and the typically large blocks (e.g., 4KB pages) over
which checksums are computed for space efficiency.
2.3. Related Work on DAX NVM Storage Redundancy
Existing proposals for maintaining system-checksums and par-
ity in NVM storage systems compromise on performance, cov-
erage, and/or programming flexibility for DAX-mapped data.
Table 1 summarizes these trade-offs. Two recent fault-tolerant
NVM file systems, Nova-Fortis [75] and Plexistore [50], up-
date and check redundancy during explicit FS calls but do
not update or verify redundancy while data is DAX mapped.
Interposing library-based solutions, such as Mojim [80], Hot-
Pot [64], and Pangolin [1], can protect DAX-mapped data
if applications use the given library’s transactional interface
for all data accesses and updates. But, software-based redun-
dancy updates on every data update incur large performance
overhead. Mojim [80] and HotPot [64] would incur very high
overhead because of DAX’s fine-grained writes 2. Pangolin [1]
reduces such overhead by eschewing per-page checksums in
favor of per-object checksums, accepting higher space over-
head instead, but still incurs performance overheads do to
redundancy updates/verifications in software. Anon [34] re-
duces the performance overhead, potentially arbitrarily, by
delaying and batching the per-page checksum updates. In
doing so, however, Anon reduces the coverage guarantees by
introducing windows of vulnerability wherein data can get
corrupted silently.
Most existing redundant NVM storage system designs do
not verify DAX application data reads with the corresponding
checksum. As shown in the fourth column of Table 1, some
do no verification while data is DAX-mapped, while others’
designs would only accommodate verifying checksums as part
of background scrubbing. Pangolin does verify the check-
sums when it reads an object into a DRAM buffer, providing
significantly tighter verifications.
The remainder of this paper describes and evaluates
2The original Mojim and HotPot designs do not include checksums, only
replication, but their designs extend naturally to include per-page checksums.
TVARAK, a software-managed hardware controller that pro-
vides in-line redundancy maintenance at low overheads and
without programming restrictions based on required use of a
given library’s interface. TVARAK updates the redundancy for
every write to the NVM device and verifies system-checksums
for every read from the NVM device.
3. TVARAK Design
TVARAK is a hardware controller that is co-located with the
last-level cache (LLC) bank controllers. It coordinates with the
file system to protect DAX-mapped data from firmware-bug-
induced corruptions. We first outline the goals of TVARAK.
We then start by describing a naive redundancy controller
design, and improve its design to reduce its overheads, leading
to TVARAK’s design. We end with TVARAK’s architecture,
area overheads, and walk through examples.
3.1. TVARAK’s Goals and Non-Goals
TVARAK intends to enable the following for DAX-mapped
NVM data: (i) detection of firmware-bug induced data corrup-
tion, (ii) recovery from such corruptions. To this end, the file
system and TVARAK maintain per-page system-checksums
and cross-DIMM parity with page striping, as shown in Fig. 3.
TVARAK’s redundancy mechanisms co-exist with other
complementary file system redundancy mechanisms that each
serve a different purpose. These complementary mechanisms
do not protect against firmware-bug-induced corruptions, and
TVARAK does not intend to protect against the failures that
these mechanisms cover. Examples of such complementary re-
dundancy mechanisms include remote replication for machine
failures [22,29,35,48], snapshots for user errors [23,61,75,81],
and inline sanity checks for file system bugs [37].
Although not TVARAK’s primary intent, TVARAK also aids
in protecting data from random bit flips and in recovery from
DIMM failures. TVARAK can detect random bit flips because
it maintains a checksum over the data. This coverage is in
concert with device-level ECCs [17, 30, 68] that are designed
for detecting and recovering from random bit flips. TVARAK’s
cross-DIMM parity also enables recovery from DIMM failures.
The file system and TVARAK ensure that recovery from a
DIMM failure does not use corrupted data/parity from other
DIMMs. To that end, the system-checksum for a page is stored
in the same DIMM as the page, and the file system verifies a
page’s data with its system-checksum before using it.
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Figure 3: TVARAK coordinates with the file system to main-
tain per-page system-checksums and cross-DIMM parity akin
to RAID-5 with page striping.
3.2. Basic Redundancy Controller Design
Fig. 4 illustrates a basic redundancy controller design that
satisfies the requirements for detecting firmware-bug induced
corruptions, as described in Section 2.1. We refer to this basic
design as NAIVE, and will improve NAIVE’s design to build
up to TVARAK. NAIVE resides above the device firmware in
the data path (with the LLC bank controllers). The file system
informs NAIVE about physical page ranges of a file when
it DAX-maps the file, along with the corresponding system-
checksum pages and the parity scheme. For each cache-line
write-back from the LLC and cache-line read into the LLC,
NAIVE performs an address range matching. NAIVE does
not do anything for cache-lines that do not belong to a DAX-
mapped regions, as illustrated in the leftmost read/write access
in Fig. 4. The file system continues to maintain the redundancy
for such data [50, 75].
For DAX-mapped cache-lines, NAIVE updates and verifies
redundancy using separate accesses from the corresponding
data. The request in the center of Fig. 4 shows a DAX cache-
line read. To verify the read, NAIVE reads the entire page
(shown with black arrows), computes the page’s checksum,
reads the page’s system-checksum (shown in olive) and veri-
fies that the two match. The rightmost request in Fig. 4 shows
a cache-line write. NAIVE reads the old data in the cache-line,
the old system-checksum, and the old parity (illustrated using
black, olive and pink, respectively). It then computes the data
diff using the old and the new data and uses that to compute the
new system-checksum and parity values3. It then writes the
new data, new system-checksum, and the new parity to NVM.
NAIVE’s cross-DIMM parity design and the use of data diffs
to update parity is similar to recently proposed RAIM-5b [83].
NAIVE, and consequently TVARAK, assume that the storage
servers are equipped with backup power to flush CPU caches
in case of a power failure. The backup power guarantees
that NAIVE and TVARAK can complete the system-checksum
and parity writes corresponding to a data write in case of a
power failure, even if they cache this information, as we will
describe later. This backup power could either be from top-of-
the-rack batteries with OS/BIOS support to flush caches, or
ADR-like support for caches with cache-controller managed
3We assume that the storage system implements incremental system-
checksums that can be updated using the data diffs, e.g., CRC.
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Figure 4: Basic Design: NAIVE operates only on DAX-mapped
data. For DAX-mapped cache-line reads, NAIVE reads the en-
tire page to compute the checksum, reads the system-checksum,
and verifies that the two match. For cache-line writes, NAIVE
reads the old data, system-checksum, and parity, computes the
data diff, uses that to compute the new system-checksum and
parity, and writes them back to NVM.
flushing. Both of these designs are common in production
systems [4, 18, 23, 33, 46, 49, 82]. Backup power also elimi-
nates the need for durability-induced cache-line flushes and
improves performance [46, 82]. We extend this assumption,
and the corresponding performance benefits, to the all the
designs we compare TVARAK to in Section 4.
3.3. Efficient Checksum Verification
Verifying system-checksums in NAIVE incurs a high overhead
because it has to read the entire page, as shown in Fig. 4. For
typical granularities of 4KB checksum pages and and 64B
cache lines, NAIVE reads 65×more cache lines (64 cache-line
in a page and one for the checksum). Although a smaller
checksum granularity would reduce the checksum verifica-
tion overhead, doing so would require dedicating more of the
expensive NVM storage for redundant data. For example,
per-cache-line checksums would require 64× more space than
per-page checksums. Indeed, the trend in storage system de-
signs is to move towards larger, rather than smaller, checksum
granularities [39, 67, 72].
We introduce DAX-CL-checksums to reconcile the perfor-
mance overhead of page-granular checksum verification with
the space overhead of cache-line checksums. Adding DAX-
CL-checksums to NAIVE results in the EV (Efficient Verifica-
tion) design shown in Fig. 5. As the name suggests, DAX-CL-
checksums are cache-line granular checksums that EV main-
tains only when data is DAX-mapped. The read request in the
middle of Fig. 5 illustrates that using DAX-CL-checksums re-
duces the read amplification to only 2× from 65× for NAIVE—
EV only needs to read the DAX-CL-checksum in addition to
the data to verify the read. The additional space for DAX-CL-
checksums is required only for the fraction of NVM that is
DAX-mapped, in contrast to maintaining cache-line-granular
or object-granular checksums for all NVM data at all times [1].
EV accesses DAX-CL-checksums separately from the cor-
responding data to ensure that the it continues to provide
protection from firmware-bug-induced corruptions. For DAX-
mapped cache-line writes, EV updates the corresponding
DAX-CL-checksum as well, using a similar process as that for
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Figure 5: Efficient Checksum Verification: DAX-CL-checksums
eliminate the need to read the entire page for DAX cache-line
read verification. Instead, EV only reads the cache-line and its
corresponding DAX-CL-checksum.
system-checksums and parity (rightmost request in Fig. 5).
Managing DAX-CL-checksums is simple because EV uses
them only while data is DAX-mapped. In particular, when
recovering from any failure or crash, the file system verifies
data integrity using system-checksums rather than DAX-CL-
checksums. Thus the file system and EV can afford to lose
DAX-CL-checksums in case of a failure. When the file system
DAX-maps a file, EV requests a buffer space for DAX-CL-
checksums. The file system can allocate this buffer space in
either NVM or in DRAM; our implementation stores DAX-
CL-checksums in NVM. The file system reclaims this space
when it unmaps a file. Unlike page system-checksums, DAX-
CL-checksums need not be stored on the same DIMM as its
corresponding data because they are not used to verify data
during recovery from a DIMM failure.
3.4. Efficient Checksum and Parity Updates
The rightmost request in Fig. 5 shows that EV incurs 4 extra
NVM reads and writes for each cache-line write to update
the redundancy. To reduce these NVM accesses, we note that
redundancy information is cache-friendly. Checksums are typi-
cally small and multiple checksums fit in one cache line. In our
implementation of 4 byte CRC-32C checksums, one 64 byte
cache-line holds 16 checksums. DAX-CL-checksums for con-
secutive cache-lines and system-checksums for consecutive
physical pages in a DIMM belong to the same cache-line. Ac-
cess locality in data leads to reuse of DAX-CL-checksum and
system-checksum cache-lines. Similarly, accesses to logically
consecutive pages lead reuse of parity cache-lines because
they belong to the same RAID stripe.
Fig. 6 shows EVU (Efficient Verification and Updates) that,
in addition to EV, caches the redundancy data, i.e., system-
checksums, DAX-CL-checksums, and parity, in a small on-
controller cache. EVU does not cache the corresponding
NVM data because the LLC already does that. EVU also uses
a partition of the LLC to increase its cache space for redun-
dancy information (not shown in the figure). Using a reserved
LLC partition for caching redundancy information limits the
interference with application data. EVU can insert up to 3
redundancy cache-lines (checksum, DAX-CL-checksum, and
parity) per data cache-line write-back. If EVU were to share
the entire LLC for caching redundancy information, each of
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Figure 6: Efficient Checksum and Parity Updates: EVU caches
redundancy cache-line in an on-controller cache and a LLC par-
tition (not shown). EVU also uses a LLC partition to store data
diffs, eliminating the need to read the old data from NVM upon
cache-line write-backs.
these redundancy cache-lines could force out application data.
Reserving a partition for redundancy information eliminates
this possibility because EVU can only evict a redundancy
cache-line when inserting a new one.
EVU also eliminates the need to fetch the old data from
NVM to compute the data diff. Cache-lines in the LLC become
dirty when they are evicted from the L2. Since the LLC
already contains the soon-to-be-old data value, EVU uses it
to compute the data diff and stores this diff in a LLC partition.
This enables EVU to directly use this data diff upon a LLC
cache-line write back (shown as maroon arrows from EVU
to LLC in the rightmost request in Fig. 6). Upon an eviction
from the LLC data diff partition (e.g., to insert a new data diff),
EVU writes-back the corresponding data without evicting it
from the LLC, and marks the data cache-line as clean in the
LLC. This ensures that the future eviction of the data cache-
line would not require EVU to read the old data either, while
allowing for reuse of the data in the LLC.
EVU’s LLC partitions (for caching redundancy and storing
data diffs) are completely decoupled from the application data
partitions. The cache controllers do not lookup application
data in EVU’s partitions, and EVU does not look up redun-
dancy or data diff cache-lines in application data partitions.
3.5. Putting it all together with TVARAK
Fig. 7 shows TVARAK’s components, which are based on
EVU’s design. One TVARAK controller co-resides with each
LLC cache bank. Each TVARAK controller consists of com-
parators for address range matching and adders for check-
sum and parity computations. TVARAK includes a small
on-controller cache for redundancy data and uses LLC way-
partitions for caching redundancy data and storing data diffs.
The controllers use MESI coherence protocol for sharing the
redundancy cache-lines between their private caches.
Area Overhead: The on-controller cache dominates
TVARAK’s area overhead because its other components (com-
parators and adders) only require small logic units. In our
evaluation with 2MB LLC cache banks, each TVARAK con-
troller consists of a 4KB cache. This implies that TVARAK’s
area is only 0.2% of the LLC. TVARAK’s design of caching
redundancy in an LLC partition instead of using its own large
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It includes comparators to identify cache-line that belong to
DAX-mapped pages and adders to compute checksums and par-
ity. It includes a small on-controller redundancy cache that is
backed by a LLC partition. TVARAK also stores the data diffs to
compute checksums and parity.
cache keeps TVARAK’s dedicated area overheads low, without
compromising on performance (Section 4).
Life of DAX-mapped cache-lines with TVARAK: For a
DAX-mapped cache-line read, TVARAK computes the corre-
sponding DAX-CL-checksum address and looks it up in the
on-controller cache. Upon a miss, it looks up the DAX-CL-
checksum in the LLC redundancy partition. If it misses in the
LLC partition as well, TVARAK reads the DAX-CL-checksum
from NVM and caches it. TVARAK read the data cache-line
from NVM, computes its checksum, and verifies it with the
DAX-CL-checksum. If the checksum verification succeeds,
TVARAK hands over the data to the bank controller. In case
of an error, TVARAK raises an interrupt that traps into the OS;
the file system then initiates a recovery using the cross-DIMM
parity.
On a DAX-mapped cache-line write, TVARAK computes
the corresponding system-checksum, DAX-CL-checksum, and
parity addresses and reads them following the same process
as above. TVARAK retrieves the data diff from the LLC bank
partition and uses that to compute the new system-checksum,
DAX-CL-checksum, and parity. TVARAK stores the updated
redundancy information in the on-controller cache, and writes-
back the data cache-line to NVM. TVARAK can safely cache
the updated redundancy information because it assumes that
servers are equipped with backup power to flush caches to
persistence in case of a power failure (Section 3.2).
TVARAK fills an important gap in NVM storage redundancy
with simple architectural changes. We believe that TVARAK
can be easily integrated in storage server chips, specially be-
cause integrating NVM devices into servers already requires
changing the on-chip memory controller to support the new
DDR-T protocol [28].
4. Evaluation
We evaluate TVARAK with 7 applications and with multiple
workloads for each application. Table 2 describes our appli-
cations and their workloads. Redis [58], Intel PMDK’s [27]
Redis Set-only and get-only with 1–6 parallel instances
C-Tree Insert-only, and 100:0, 50:50, & 0:100 updates:reads with 12 parallel instances
B-Tree Insert-only, and 100:0, 50:50, & 0:100 updates:reads with 12 parallel instances
RB-Tree Insert-only, and 100:0, 50:50, & 0:100 updates:reads with 12 parallel instances
Fio Sequential and random reads and writes with 12 threads
Stream 4 memory bandwidth intensive kernels with 12 threads
Table 2: Applications and their workloads.
tree-based key-value stores (C-Tree, B-Tree, and RB-Tree),
and N-Store [7] are NVM applications with complex access
patterns. We also use fio [9] to generate synthetic sequential
and random access patterns, and stream [66] for sequential
access memory-bandwidth intensive microbenchmarks.
We compare TVARAK with three alternatives: Baseline,
TxB-Object-Csums, and TxB-Page-Csums. Baseline imple-
ments no redundancy mechanisms. TxB-Object-Csums and
TxB-Page-Csums are software-only redundancy approaches;
TxB-Object-Csums is based on Pangolin [1] and TxB-Page-
Csums is based on Mojim [80] and HotPot [64]. Both
TxB-Object-Csums and TxB-Page-Csums update system-
checksums and parity when applications inform the inter-
posing library after completing a write, which is typically
at a transaction boundary (TxB). TxB-Object-Csums main-
tains system-checksums at an object granularity, whereas TxB-
Page-Csums maintains system-checksums at a page granular-
ity. TxB-Object-Csums does not need to read the entire page
to compute the system-checksum after a write; it computes
the new system-checksum from the new data directly. How-
ever, TxB-Object-Csums has higher space overhead because
of object-granular checksums. Neither TxB-Page-Csums nor
our TxB-Object-Csums verify the data read by an applica-
tion with the corresponding system-checksum; thus, our TxB-
Object-Csums should overpredict performance for Pangolin’s
approach (which includes read verification). TVARAK updates
system-checksums and parity upon every write-back from the
LLC to the NVM, and verifies system-checksums upon every
read from the NVM to the LLC. As mentioned in Section 3.2,
we assume battery-backed CPU caches and none of the designs
flush cache-lines for durability.
Methodology: We use zsim [62] to simulate a system sim-
ilar to Intel Westmere processors [62]. Table 3 details our
simulation parameters. We simulate 12 OOO cores, each
with 32KB private L1 and 256KB private L2 caches. The
cores share a 24MB last level cache (LLC) with 12 banks
of 2MB each. The simulated system consists of 6 DRAM
DIMMs and 4 NVM DIMMs. For NVM DIMMs, we use
the latency and energy parameters derived by Lee et al. [38]
(60/150 ns read/write latency, 1.6/9 nJ per read/write). We
evaluate the impact of changing the number of NVM DIMMs
and the underlying NVM technology (and the associated per-
formance characteristics) in Section 4.8. We use a fixed-work
methodology and perform the same amount of application
work for each design: baseline, TVARAK, TxB-Object-Csums,
and TxB-Page-Csums. Unless stated otherwise, we present
the average of three runs for each data point with root mean
square error bars.
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Cores 12 cores, x86-64 ISA, 2.27 GHz,Westmere-like OOO [62]
L1-D caches 32KB, 8-way set-associative, 4 cycle latency,LRU replacement, 15/33 pJ per hit/miss [44]
L1-I caches 32KB, 4-way set-associative, 3 cycle latency,LRU replacement, 15/33 pJ per hit/miss [44]
L2 caches 256KB, 8-way set-associative, 7 cycle latency,LRU replacement, 46/94 pJ per hit/miss [44]
L3 cache
24MB (12 2MB banks), 16-way set-associative,
27 cycle latency, shared and inclusive,
MESI coherence, 64B lines
LRU replacement, 240/500 pJ per hit/miss [44]
DRAM 6 DDR DIMMs, 15ns reads/writes
NVM 4 DDR DIMMs, 60ns reads, 150ns writes [38]1.6/9 nJ per read/write [38]
TVARAK
4KB on-controller cache with 1 cycle latency, 15/33 pJ per hit/miss
2 cycle latency for address range matching
1 cycle per checksum/parity computation and verification,
2 ways (out of 16) reserved for caching redundancy information,
1 way (out of 16) for storing data diffs.
Table 3: Simulation Parameters
4.1. Key Evaluation Takeaways
We highlight the key takeaways from our results before de-
scribing each application’s results in detail.
• TVARAK provides efficient redundancy updates for applica-
tion data writes, e.g., with only 1.5% overhead over baseline
that provides no redundancy for a insert-only workload with
tree-based key-value stores (C-Tree, B-Tree, RB-Tree).
• TVARAK verifies all application data reads, unlike most
existing solutions, and does so efficiently. For example,
in comparison to baseline that does not verify any reads,
TVARAK slows down Redis get-only workload by only 3%.
• TVARAK benefits from application data access locality
because that leads to better cache usage for redundancy
information. For example, for synthetic fio benchmarks,
TVARAK has negligible overheads with sequential accesses,
but 2% overhead for random reads and 33% for random
writes, compared to baseline.
• TVARAK outperforms existing software-only redundancy
mechanisms. For example, for Nstore workloads, TxB-
Object-Csums is 33–53% slower than TVARAK, and TxB-
Page-Csums is 180–390% slower than TVARAK.
• TVARAK’s efficiency comes without an increase in (dedi-
cated) space requirements. TxB-Object-Csums outperforms
TxB-Page-Csums but at the cost of higher space overhead
for per-object checksums. TVARAK instead uses DAX-CL-
checksums that improve performance without demanding
dedicated storage.
4.2. Redis
Redis is a widely used single-threaded in-memory key-value
store that uses a hashtable as its primary data structure [57].
We modify Redis (v3.1) to use a persistent memory heap
using Intel PMDK’s libpmemobj library [27], building upon
an open-source implementation [58]. We vary the number of
Redis instances, each of which operate independently. We use
the redis-benchmark utility to spawn 100 clients that together
generate 1 million requests per Redis instance. We use set-
only and get-only workloads. We show the results only for
6 Redis instances for ease or presentation; the trends are the
same for 1–6 Redis instances that we evaluated.
Fig. 8(a) shows the runtime for Redis set-only and get-
only workloads. In comparison to baseline, that maintains no
redundancy, TVARAK increases the runtime by only 3% for
both the workloads. In contrast, TxB-Object-Csums typically
increases the runtime by 50% and TxB-Page-Csums by 200%
over the baseline for the set-only workload. For get-only
workloads, TxB-Object-Csums and TxB-Page-Csums increase
the runtime for by a maximum of 5% and 28% over baseline,
respectively. This increase for TxB-Object-Csums and TxB-
Page-Csums, despite them not verifying any application data
reads, is because Redis use libpmemobj transactions for get
requests as well; these transactions lead to persistent metadata
writes (e.g., to set the transaction state as started or committed).
Redis uses transactions for get requests because it uses an
incremental hashing design wherein it rehashes its hashtable
incrementally upon each request. The incremental rehashing
can lead to writes for get requests also. We do not change
Redis’ behavior to eliminate these transactions to suit our get-
only workload which wouldn’t actually trigger a rehashing.
Figs. 8(b) to 8(d) show the energy, NVM accesses and
cache accesses. The energy results are similar to that for
runtime. For the set-only workload, TVARAK performs more
NVM accesses than TxB-Object-Csums because TVARAK
does not cache the data or redundancy information in the L1
and L2 caches; TxB-Object-Csums instead performs more
cache accesses. Even though TxB-Page-Csums can and does
use the caches (demonstrated by TxB-Page-Csums’s more
than 200× more cache accesses than baseline), it also requires
more NVM accesses because it needs to read the entire page
to compute the page-granular system-checksums. For get-only
workloads, TVARAK performs more NVM accesses than both
TxB-Object-Csums and TxB-Page-Csums because it verifies
the application data reads with DAX-CL-checksums.
4.3. Key-value Data Structures
We use three persistent memory key-value data structures,
namely C-Tree, B-Tree, and RB-Tree, from Intel PMDK [27].
We use PMDK’s pmembench utility to generate insert-only,
update-only, balanced (50:50 updates:reads), and read-only
workloads. We stress the NVM usage by using 12 instances
of each data-structure; each instance is driven by a single
threaded workload generator. Having 12 independent in-
stances of single-threaded workloads allows us to remove
locks from the data-structures and increase the workload
throughput. We show the results for insert-only and balanced
workloads; the trends are the same for other workloads.
Figs. 8(e) to 8(h) show the runtime, energy, and NVM and
cache accesses for the different workloads and data-structures.
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Figure 8: Runtime, energy, and NVM and cache accesses for various Redis (Figs. 8(a) to 8(d)), tree-based key-value data structures
(Figs. 8(e) to 8(h)), N-Store (Figs. 8(i) to 8(l)), Fio (Figs. 8(m) to 8(p)), and Stream (Figs. 8(q) to 8(t)) workloads. We divide NVM
accesses into data and redundancy information accesses, and cache accesses into L1, L2, LLC, and on-TVARAK cache.
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For the insert-only workload, TVARAK increases the runtime
by a maximum of 1.5% (for RB-Tree) over the baseline while
updating the redundancy for all inserted tuples. In contrast,
TxB-Object-Csums and TxB-Page-Csums increase the run-
time by 43% and 171% over the baseline, respectively. For the
balanced workload, TVARAK updates the redundancy for tuple
updates and also verifies tuple reads with system-checksums
with only 5% increase in runtime over the baseline for C-Tree
and B-Tree. TxB-Object-Csums incurs a 20% increase in run-
time over baseline for just updating the redundancy upon tuple
updates; TxB-Page-Csums performs even worse.
4.4. N-Store
N-Store is a NVM-optimized relational DBMS. We use update-
heavy (90:10 updates:reads), balanced (50:50 updates:reads)
and read-heavy (10:90 updates:reads) YCSB workloads with
high skew (90% of transactions go to 10% of tuples) [7]. We
use 4 client threads to drive the workload and perform a total
of 800000 transactions. For N-Store, we present results from
a single run with no error bars.
Figs. 8(i) to 8(l) show runtime and energy, and NVM and
cache accesses. TVARAK increases the runtime by 27% and
41% over the baseline for the read-heavy and update-heavy
workloads, respectively. TVARAK’s overheads are higher with
N-Store, than with Redis or key-value structures, because N-
Store uses a linked list based write-ahead log that leads to
a random write access pattern for update transactions. Each
update transaction allocates and writes to a linked list node. Be-
cause the linked list layout is not sequential in NVM, TVARAK
incurs cache-misses for the redundancy information and per-
forms more NVM accesses. The random write access pattern
also affects TxB-Object-Csums and TxB-Page-Csums, with
a 70%–117% and 264%–600% longer runtime than baseline,
respectively. This is because the TxB-Object-Csums and TxB-
Page-Csums also incur misses for for redundancy information
in the L1, L2 and LLC caches and have to perform more NVM
accesses for random writes.
4.5. Fio Benchmarks
Fio is a file system benchmarking tool that supports multiple
access patterns [9]. We use Fio’s libpmem engine that accesses
DAX-mapped NVM file data using load and store instructions.
We use sequential and random read and write workloads with
a 64B access granularity. We use 12 concurrent threads with
each thread performing 32MB worth of accesses (reads or
writes). Each thread accesses data from a non-overlapping
512MB region, and no cache-line is accessed twice.
Figs. 8(m) to 8(p) show the results for fio. As discussed
above in the context of N-Store, random access pattern in the
application hurt TVARAK because of poor reuse for redun-
dancy cache-lines with random accesses. This trend is visible
for fio as well—whereas TVARAK has essentially the same
runtime as baseline for sequential accesses, TVARAK increases
the runtime by 2% and 33% over baseline for random reads
and writes, respectively. However, TVARAK still outperforms
TxB-Object-Csums and TxB-Page-Csums for the write work-
loads. For read workloads, TxB-Object-Csums and TxB-Page-
Csums have no impact because they do not verify application
data reads. For the random write workload, TVARAK incurs
a higher energy overhead than TxB-Object-Csums. This is
because the energy required for additional NVM accesses that
TVARAK generates exceed that required for the additional
cache accesses that TxB-Object-Csums generates.
4.6. Stream Benchmarks
Stream is a memory bandwidth stress tool [66] that is part
of the HPC Challenge suite [24]. Stream comprises of four
sequential access kernels: (i) Copy data from one array to
another, (ii) Scale elements from one array by a constant factor
and write them in a second array, (iii) Add elements from two
arrays and write them in a third array, and (iv) Triad which is
a combination of Add and Scale: it scales the elements from
one array, adds them to the corresponding elements from the
second array, and stores the values in a third array. We modify
stream to store and access data in persistent memory. We use
12 concurrent threads that operate on non-overlapping regions
of the arrays. Each array has a size of 128MB.
Figs. 8(q) to 8(t) show the results for the four kernels. The
trends are similar to the preceding results. TVARAK, TxB-
Object-Csums, and TxB-Page-Csums increase the runtime by
6%–21%, 700%–1200%, and 1800%–3200% over the base-
line, respectively. The absolute value of the overheads are
higher for all the designs because the baseline already satu-
rates the NVM bandwidth, unlike the real-world applications
considered above that consume the data in more complex fash-
ions. The impact of computation complexity is clear even
across the four microbenchmarks: copy is the simplest kernel,
followed by scale, add, and triad. Consequently, the overheads
for all the designs are highest for the copy kernel and lowest
for the triad kernel.
4.7. Impact of TVARAK’s Design Choices
We break down the impact of TVARAK’s design choices,
namely, using DAX-CL-checksum, caching redundancy infor-
mation, and storing data diff in LLC. We present the results for
one workload from each of the above applications: set-only
workload with 6 instances for Redis, insert-only workload for
C-Tree, balanced workload for N-Store, random write work-
load for fio, and triad kernel for stream.
Fig. 9 shows the performance for the naive design, and then
adds individual design elements, i.e., DAX-CL-checksums,
redundancy caching, and storing data diffs in LLC. With all
the design elements, we get the complete TVARAK design.
For Redis, C-Tree and stream’s triad kernel, all of TVARAK’s
design choices improve performance. This is the case for B-
Tree, RB-Tree, other stream kernels, and fio sequential access
workloads as well (not shown in the figure). For N-Store and
fio random write workload, redundancy caching and storing
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Figure 9: Impact of TVARAK’s Design Choices: We evaluate the
impact of TVARAK’s design optimizations with one workload for
each application. We present the results for the naive design
and then add optimizations, DAX-CL-checksums, redundancy
caching, and data diffs in LLC. With all the optimizations en-
abled, we get TVARAK.
data diffs in the LLC hurt performance. This is because taking
away cache space from application data creates more NVM
accesses than that saved by caching the redundancy data and
storing the data diffs in LLC for N-Store and fio random
writes:w —their random access patterns lead to poor reuse of
redundancy cache-lines.
This evaluation highlights the importance of choosing the
LLC partition space that TVARAK uses to cache redundancy
information or to store data diffs. We leave dynamically adapt-
ing the partition sizes based on the workload characteristics
for future work. The partition sizes can be adapted either by
TVARAK using set duelling [54], or by the OS by application
profiling.
4.8. Sensitivity Analysis
We evaluate the sensitivity of TVARAK to the size of LLC
partitions that it can use for caching redundancy information
and storing data diffs. We present the results for one workload
from each of the set of applications, namely, set-only workload
with 6 instances for Redis, insert-only workload for C-Tree,
balanced workload for N-Store, random write workload for
fio, and triad kernel for stream.
Fig. 10(a) shows the impact of changing the number of LLC
ways (out of 16) that TVARAK can use for caching redundancy
information. Redis and C-Tree are largely unaffected by the
redundancy partition size, with Redis benefitting marginally
from reserving 2 ways instead of 1. Stream and fio, being syn-
thetic memory stressing microbenchmarks, demonstrate that
dedicating a larger partition for redundancy caching improves
TVARAK’s performance because of the increased cache space.
N-Store is cache-sensitive and taking away the cache from
application data for redundancy hurts its performance.
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Figure 10: Impact of changing the number of LLC ways (out of
16) that TVARAK can use for caching redundancy data and for
storing data diffs.
Fig. 10(b) shows the sensitivity of TVARAK to the number
of ways reserved for storing data diffs. As with the sensi-
tivity to redundancy information partition size, changing the
data diff partition size has negligible impact on Redis and
C-Tree. For N-Store, increasing the number of ways reserved
for storing data diffs hurts performance because N-Store is
cache-sensitive. Stream and fio show an interesting pattern,
increasing the number of data diff ways from 1 to 4 hurts
performance, but increasing it to 6 or 8 improves performance
(although the performance remains worse than reserving just 1
way). This is because dedicating more ways for storing data
diffs has two contradicting effect. It reduces the number of
write-backs due to data diff evictions, but it also causes more
write-backs because of the reduced cache space for application
data. Their combined effect dictates the overall performance.
We also evaluate the impact of increasing the number of
NVM DIMMs and changing the underlying NVM technology
on baseline, TVARAK, TxB-Object-Csums, and TxB-Page-
Csums. The relative performance trends stay the same with
both of these changes; we do not show the results here for
brevity. As an example, even with 8 NVM DIMMs or with
improved NVM performance by considering battery-backed
DRAM as NVM, TVARAK continues to outperform TxB-
Object-Csums and TxB-Page-Csums by orders of magnitude
for the stream microbenchmarks.
5. Conclusion
TVARAK efficiently maintains system-checksums and cross-
device parity for DAX NVM storage, addressing controller and
firmware imperfections expected to arise with NVM as they
have with other storage technologies. As a hardware offload,
managed by the storage software, TVARAK does so with min-
imal overhead and much more efficiently that software-only
approaches. Since system-level redundancy is expected from
production storage, TVARAK is an important step towards the
use of DAX NVM as primary storage.
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